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thoughts on browser security design

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As the web has grown, it has surpassed its original goal and design ideas, as
such not only did new concepts plugged in to extend its features(JavaScript) but
in the recent years it has also grown much more controlled and tracks people
much more readily than it once did.
While navi does protect the network node of the user, making their real location
anonymous, it does not prevent an user from outing themselves by design: it is a
wanted feature to, say, be able to login to twitter.
With that said navi does enable some protections that makes tracking, by
default, impossible and renders your traffic as uniform as the rest of the Tor
network, as such it would be impossible to, say, if this website you visited
belonged to you or to user X of your end node without having compromised the entry
node too, which is a X*(10^-3) * Y*(3*(10^-3)) chance, as of 2020. If your
adversary owns 500 different machines reparted in an equal fashion across guard
and exit nodes then you are at a chance less than 18%. This is much higher than
I hoped for but I can't really do anything about that, I'm already a tor relay
operator. The hope of the Tor Project is that no adversary is truly global and
while I understand their point of view it seems we are crucially undernumbered
in my humble opinion.
With that out of the way and the assumption that both guard and exit nodes
aren't compromised, we will make two different assumptions: what if either:
* your exit node is compromised along with a chunk of the TLS certificates
you're visiting
* several websites you're visiting are working together to try to pinpoint who
you are by mean of fingerprinting
In either case the enemy doesn't know your location but is able to get a
database of connections made they want to track, either by singling them out
from other connections in the end node(assumption 1) or linking them back to
another public well known identity(assumption 2). It is to note that Assumption
1 is much harder to get to work because it involves being able to passively
fingerprint connections.
If the enemy wants to know who you are, they need to trace back the connection between the
website X and the connection they want to trace back, let's call it Y.
To do so they employ a technique known as fingerprinting: instead of tying back
your identity thanks to your network connection they will collerate your
activity through multiple websites, by identifying uniquely your _device_ instead.
While identifying yourself is indeed a wanted feature of navi it should in no
way facilitate the work of an attacker to out an user who is not actively giving
out information to a service.
Fingerprinting can, loosely, be accomplished in two ways: Data-Sharing
fingerprinting and Device Identity fingerprinting. In the first case, a website
set shared data that gets read by another website while in the latter a website
calculates a fingerprint of a specific user that is then matched by a
fingerprint calculated indepandantly by the other website.
To harden against that, navi's default firefox configuration incorporates two
things: first party isolation, which isolates data by the URL of the website and
fingerprinting spoofing, which makes your browser harder to fingerprint.
As most fingerprinting data can be retrieved from JavaScript and that navi is
aimed at technical users, the default config is much more hardened than TBB by
disabling JavaScript globally, enabling it on a per need basis. Several
anti-trackers/fingerprinters are also installed by default: uBlock, Privacy
Badger, which is Heuristic based and firefox default one, while decentraleyes
lowers tha amount of CDN-based requests made. HTTPS Everywhere makes the TLS
encryption mandatory to avoid the assumption 1 listed earlier to happen easily
and Cookie AutoDelete is used to avoid having websites that can track you after
you stopped visiting their website.
When disabling JavaScript, only a few datas are able to be used for
fingerprinting, namely accept headers and the user agent, both are which are
spoofed to very common ones and standard ones across the network, making your
browser session theoretically indistinguishible from other users on the same
exit node with JavaScript disabled. Some anti-fingerprinting techniques are done
on the JavaScript side of things too but, as JavaScript inherently requires a
ton of data such as your screen size and installed fonts to work correctly, it
is fairly hard to keep a common fingerprint across all users, for that reason it
isn't the focus of navi. navi's hope is that trackers on site that you'll login
in will hopefully be blocked by the built-in anti finerprinting tools and that
you won't enable JavaScript at any website you see, we can't help with you
shooting yourselves in the foot. TBB DOES have a slightly better JavaScript
fingerprint harm reduction although they are still very much actively
fingerprintable; For example latest TBB on Android has a unique fingerprint
according to panopticlick, and JavaScript is enabled by default.
navi's approach compared to TBB is as such more tightened by default, and adds a
bunch of preventive techniques to avoid active fingerprinting between multiple
identities that TBB does not provide, albeit with a slightly better resistance
to fingerprinting. It should also be noted that navi is a full desktop work
environment, and as such features like saving history by default are enabled.
If you want a clean cut from your tor identity on top of keeping no data of your
session then using TBB is encouraged.
It was also decided to use latest Firefox compared to TBB as most useful tor
patches are already inside firefox as about:config flags thanks to the Tor
Uplift project and that I believe that it is more secure to run on the latest
version of firefox compared to TBB ESR which, even if it does have security
patches, takes longer to roll out and is also less of a moving target for
offensive security researchers. This also allows us to roll our own sandbox
config on top of the standard firefox and make it use wayland, on top of
potentially enabling things such as the new WebRender.

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